The paper assesses the impact of ambiguity and agents'sensitivity to ambiguity on the historically observed equity premium. The term ambiguity in general refers to an agent's uncertainty about the "true" probability distribution governing future outcomes as in the famous Ellsberg examples. In this paper the ambiguity we consider is the uncertainty about the persistent but latent state governing future aggregate consumption/dividend growth.
Introduction
Following intuitive arguments of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961) , and pioneering formalizations by Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , it is now customary in modern decision theory to distinguish two categories of subjectively uncertain belief: unambiguous and ambiguous. An unambiguous belief may be expressed as a probability distribution and is more commonly known as "risk". An ambiguous belief, on the other hand, cannot be expressed using a single probability distribution. Hence, an event is thought to be deemed ambiguous by a decision maker if the decision maker's belief about the event, as revealed by his preferences (over acts measurable with respect to the event), cannot be expressed as a unique probability. The usual interpretation is that the decision maker is uncertain about the "true"probability of the ambiguous event and takes this uncertainty into account when making his choice. This uncertainty about the "true" probability distribution governing future outcomes is dubbed ambiguity. The nature and extent of allowance the decision maker gives to this uncertainty when making his choices (e.g., wether he is averse to such uncertainty and if so, how much averse) is determined by his ambiguity attitude.
Introspection and experimental evidence, typi…ed by the Ellsberg examples, suggest that agents commonly adjust their behavior in response to such uncertainty. In the economics literature, agents are typically seen to be averse to ambiguity and inclined to choose actions whose consequences are more robust to the perceived ambiguity, e.g., a portfolio position whose (ex ante) value is relatively less a¤ected by the uncertainty about probability distribution governing the future payo¤s (Dow and Werlang 1992 , Epstein and Wang 1994 , Mukerji and Tallon 2001 , Gollier 2006 . In this paper we investigate how much of the historically observed equity premium may be accounted for by the interaction between ambiguity about the probability distribution over future growth in consumption and agents'sensitivity to this ambiguity.
The equity premium puzzle originally refers to the fact that the Lucas (1978) intertemporal general equilibrium model with a single representative agent can …t the data of the historically observed steady consumption growth, low risk-free rates and high risk premiums only if the coe¢ cient of (relative) risk aversion is allowed to be high in absolute value. This is a puzzle in the sense that, given the consumption risk identi…ed in the data, the value of risk aversion coe¢ cient required to explain the observed premium is incompatible with both the observed data on the risk free rate and behavior under risk observed in other domains, for example in experiments. In a similar vein, to evaluate what e¤ect ambiguity may have had in the generation of equity premium, one has to be able to identify, …rst, the range of ambiguity aversion that is consistent with behavior observed in other domains and second, the levels of ambiguity that are statistically consistent with 1 the historically observed data on consumption and dividends outcomes in each sample period. Next, turning to the theory, we have to endow the representative agent with preferences that map the ambiguity and ambiguity aversion to a decision rule. Putting this decision rule through an appropriate general equilibrium model would then generate restrictions on equilibrium rates of return. By pairing the theory on equilibrium restriction with the empirics, we will be able to identify prediction of equilibrium rates corresponding to the level of ambiguity consistent with data history at each point in the history and compatible with the range of ambiguity attitude observed in other domains. We may further restrict predictions to be internally consistent in the sense of being consistent with the risk free rate observed in the data, just as in the standard analysis of the equity premium puzzle. This outlines the task attempted in paper.
Regularities about ambiguity averse behavior, both qualitative and quantitative, have been researched quite exhaustively in laboratory experiments, as chronicled in (Camerer 1999) . Over the past decade, an impressive array of work has established, theoretically, the rich qualitative implications of ambiguity in diverse economic models. Hence, it is natural to ask, what quantitative restrictions the regularities about ambiguity aversion observed in the laboratory impose on data generated by real life, market-based economic and …nancial decisions? In other words, we are asking for a statistical test of the quantitative relevance of the impact of ambiguity in a market setting. This is a general question that motivates the outlined task. The more speci…c question of establishing the empirical relationship of ambiguity to equity premium is, of course, another motivation, in particular because, as pointed out in (Gollier 2006) , in theory the relationship could go either way; ambiguity could lead to both an increase or a diminution of equity premium, depending on circumstances.
This paper considers a Lucas-tree pure-exchange economy, wherein an in…nitely lived representative agent is endowed with a unit of a stock, a Lucas-tree, which yields a stochastic dividend, the "fruit", every period. To enable him to smooth his consumption across time, the agent may trade in a safe asset, a bond, which is in zero net supply and an asset with uncertain payo¤s, the Lucas-tree. The prices of the assets are determined endogenously by period-by-period market clearing in the usual way: equilibrium prices are such that the agent always consumes his endowment, i.e., holds on to his tree. We introduce two key non-standard assumptions in this standard setting. One, that his beliefs about the dividend process is ambiguous, i.e., he is uncertain about the exact probability distribution governing the realization of future dividends and two, that the agent's preferences are sensitive to this ambiguity.
We assume that the representative agent has smooth ambiguity preferences (?, henceforth KMM2005, KMM2008) on consumption plans whose payo¤s are state contingent . In this preference representation ambiguity is modeled as a second order probability over …rst order probability distributions on (payo¤ determining) contingencies deemed possible by the decision maker. The representation functional is an expectation of an expectation; the inner expectations evaluate the expected utilities corresponding to possible …rst order probabilities the outer expectation aggregates a transform of these expected utilities with respect to the second order prior. The transformation function on the expected utilities models ambiguity attitude; in particular, if the transformation is concave we have ambiguity aversion, if it is a¢ ne we have ambiguity neutrality. The second order prior is what represents the agent's uncertainty about the possible probability distributions on payo¤ relevant contingencies, and hence the agent's ambiguity. The fact that ambiguity attitude are identi…ed by two di¤erent parameters in the preference representation is very akin to the parametric separation of risk and risk attitude in the expected utility model and is a key property of smooth ambiguity preferences. (This property is not shared by the pioneering models of ambiguity aversion, such as the maximin expected utility and Choquet expected utility.) This separation is crucial to the analysis in this paper; it is what allows us to calibrate ambiguity and ambiguity attitude to observed data and thereby allows us to understand how of much of a contribution of ambiguity to equity premium is compatible with data just as risk and risk attitude are calibrated to data to generate the equity premium puzzle.
We calibrate the agent's belief to the maintained assumption that the economy evolves according to a hidden state model analyzed in Bansal and Yaron (2004) . In Bansal and Yaron's model, a (dated) "hidden"or "latent"state variable describes the evolving economic potential of the economy and drives the growth process but is itself not observed. E¤ectively, the agent believes the next period's growth is a Gaussian random variable with an unknown mean and hence, the distribution on next period's growth is uncertain. In the basic version of the model we analyze, the hidden state variable …xes the unknown mean of the probability distribution of next period's growth, in the sense that if the realization of the latent state were known so would be the mean of this probability distribution. Since it is assumed that this distribution is Gaussian with a given (time invariant) volatility parameter, knowing the mean would be enough to pin down the distribution. The hidden state is not constant over time. It evolves, randomly, period by period, as an AR(1) process. Starting with a Gaussian prior belief on the date 0 hidden state, the updated Bayesian belief on the current, date t, hidden state, updated on the basis of the history of growth outcomes using the Kalman …lter method, is also Gaussian; this updated belief on the date t hidden state is what constitutes, in our formulation, the ambiguity the representative agent faces at date t. This …ltered belief is, literally, the date t second-order posterior on the possible probability distributions over future consumption and therefore the contemporaneous ambiguity about the probability over (the contingent) future consumption. Hansen (Hansen 2007) has dubbed this kind of uncertainty about the data generating process, "statistical ambiguity"; it is the uncertainty (at date t) about the probability distribution over future growth outcomes given the best statistical (rational, Bayesian) inference from (publicly available data) history of observations on growth outcomes up until time t. Note, in the adopted stochastic formulation, there is constant learning about the hidden state as growth outcomes become known, but the learning is never complete because the hidden state evolves randomly. Finally, we combine the ambiguity constructed from data, as just described, with estimates of a parametric speci…cation of ambiguity aversion and risk aversion that are plausible, in the sense of being consistent with experimental data, to obtain restrictions on the equilibrium rates of return implied by the (amended) Lucas-tree model. We further focus the predicted rates by requiring the calibration to match the historic risk free rate of return. We …nd, corresponding to our base line stochastic speci…cation without stochastic volatility and (constant relative) risk aversion set to 2.5, when ambiguity aversion is calibrated to yield risk free rates of around 1%, the level of equity premium averages to about 4.9% per year with a volatility (standard deviation) of about 8.5%. Further, we argue, there is a precise sense in which the level of ambiguity aversion required is extremely modest and to that extent, very plausible.
Related literature
Three papers closest to this work are Ju and Miao (2008) , Hansen and Sargent (2006) , Bansal and Yaron (2004) . Ju and Miao (2008) : Pioneering application of the smooth ambiguity framework to assess the e¤ect of ambiguity on dynamics of asset prices. The model of stochastic evolution of belief is di¤erent from the one used in this paper and the parametric speci…cation of ambiguity attitude is also di¤erent. The hidden/latent state variable driving the (mean) growth rate in the economy may take a continuum of values in our model, while it may take only two possible values (and thus only two possible growth rates) in their model. The ambiguity aversion function in this paper is of the exponential form, whereas in Ju and Miao it is of the power variety. The exponential form has the advantage that it makes the mechanism by which ambiguity aversion a¤ects the rates of return in equilibrium more transparent. As we shall see, this transparency is facilitated by the fact that this formulation, unlike the power-power speci…cation, lends itself to a (node-speci…c) change of measure interpretation. Richer framework of stochastic evolution of belief allows for a more complete description of the ambiguity faced by the representative agent on the actual sample path. Given this richer description of uncertainty we …nd the ambiguity aversion parameter that best matches the data is very small (absolute ambiguity aversion coe¢ cient is less than 2) compared to the relative ambiguity aversion parameter their calibrations seem to require. Hansen and Sargent (2006) : They study e¤ect of model uncertainty on the representative agents beliefs and, in turn, on price of risk. One formulation of their model corresponds to a particular parametrization of the smooth ambiguity model (where the ambiguity attitude is speci…ed as an exponential function and the risk attitude as the log function). As noted in Ju and Miao Ju and Miao (2008) this is not a very revealing speci…cation as far as e¤ect of ambiguity aversion on equity premium is concerned since for this particular speci…cation learning and ambiguity aversion does not a¤ect the return on stocks (it only a¤ects the risk free return). To the extent we allow for relative rates of risk aversion di¤erent from one, this paper generalizes the account in Hansen and Sargent (2006) . The use of Bansal and Yaron's stochastic model in the present paper is very much inspired by its application in Hansen and Sargent (2006) . It is an advantage of the Hansen and Sargent's (2006) framework that it can incorporate e¤ects of having a intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter uncoupled from risk aversion parameter. Indeed, the key empirical results in Hansen and Sargent use a speci…cation that adds to the above a Kreps and Porteus (1978) /Epstein and Zin (1991) like separation of intertemporal elasticity of substitution from risk aversion. The pure e¤ect of ambiguity on rates of return is not quite brought out in that paper which concentrates more on the price of the risk free asset. Bansal and Yaron (2004) pioneered the (basic) stochastic model used in this paper. They used the model to explore how much long run risk as embodied in the stochastic model and aversion to such risk as possible through a Kreps and Porteus/Epstein and Zin like separation of intertemporal elasticity of substitution from risk aversion could explain aspects of equity premium. They did not explore the issue of ambiguity. The present paper, following the inspiration in Hansen and Sargent (2006) , shows implications of same stochastic model through a perspective of ambiguity sensitive preferences. (Gollier 2006) shows analytically, in the particular setting of a two period (static) smooth ambiguity model, that an increase in ambiguity aversion may not, in general, increase the equity premium and provides a su¢ cient conditions such that it does. Thus, it makes an even more compelling case for empirical investigation of the question of the connection between ambiguity and equity premium.
Smooth ambiguity and the Lucas tree
We describe here the analytical framework used. It consists of a usual Lucas tree economy but for the representative agent's preferences. The latter are of the smooth ambiguity type (Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2005, Klibano¤, Marinacci, and Mukerji 2008) . We …rst recall the basics of static smooth ambiguity preferences and its recursive extension to a dynamic setting. Next we describe the general economy under consideration. Finally, we derive equilibrium Euler equations for interest rates and asset returns. We leave to section 3 the precise description of the stochastic process governing the consumption/dividend processes.
2.1 Agent' s preferences: the smooth ambiguity model and its recursive formulation KMM2005 proposed and axiomatized a model of preferences over acts such that the decision maker prefers act f to act g if and only if
where E is the expectation operator, u is a vN-M utility function, is an increasing transformation, and is a subjective probability over the set of probability measures that the decision maker thinks are relevant given his subjective information. A key feature of this model is that it achieves a separation between ambiguity, identi…ed as a characteristic of the decision maker's subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitude, a characteristic of the decision maker's tastes. We show that attitudes towards pure risk are characterized by the shape of u, as usual, while attitudes towards ambiguity are characterized by the shape of , given u.
One advantage of this model is that the well-developed machinery for dealing with risk attitudes can be applied as well to ambiguity attitudes. In the present paper we apply the model in KMM2008, which presents a dynamic version of the smooth ambiguity model. In KMM2008 the basis of the dynamic model is the state space S, the set of all observation paths generated by an event tree, a graph of decision/observation nodes. The root node of the tree, s 0 , branches out into a set of (immediate) successor nodes each of which represents a stochastic contingency at time t = 1 and is generically denoted by s 1 : Each node s 1 further branches out into (immediate) successor nodes s 2 at time t = 2 and so on into the in…nite future. S is the set of all paths through this event tree; the generic element of S is denoted by s: The decision maker's elements of choice are plans f each of which associates a payo¤ to each pair (t; s). The decision maker is (subjectively) uncertain about which stochastic process gives the appropriate description of probabilities on the event tree. The domain of this uncertainty is given by a parameter space , each element of which (generically denoted by ) is a vector of parameters exhaustively describing a particular stochastic process . We denote by (B j s t ) the probability under distribution that the observation path will belong to the set B, given that we have reached node s t . Correspondingly, (s t+1 ; s t ) is the probability under distribution that the next observation will be s t+1 , given we have reached node s t . The decision maker's subjective prior belief about the stochastic process, elicited from his preferences, is described by a distribution , de…ned on 2 , i.e., : 2 ! [0; 1]. The decision maker's posterior belief about which stochastic process applies at a node s t is given by the Bayesian posterior distribution ( j s t ). KMM2008 obtain assumptions and conditions on preferences such that preferences on plans f , at a node s t , are represented by the following recursive functional form:
(1) where V s t (f ) is a recursively de…ned value function, u is a vN-M utility index, is a discount factor and a function whose shape characterizes the decision maker's ambiguity attitude.
A Lucas-tree economy
There is an in…nitely-lived representative consumer, consuming a single good. He can trade in a risk free asset, whose holding at time t is denoted b t and its price is denoted p f t . There is also an asset (quantity normalized to 1 unit) that yields a stochastic dividend at each period, D t . The price of the asset at time t is denoted p t , its holding e t . Consumption at time t is denoted C t .
As in Yaron (2004) andCampbell (1996) we will assume that dividend and consumption follow di¤erent stochastic processes, thus departing from the original Lucas tree economy. The gap between consumption and dividend is due to some (exogenously given) labor income t . Equilibrium will require that at each time C t = t + D t . It is thus equivalent to derive the stochastic process followed by C t from the assumed processes for D t and t as we do in this section (and as is more in line with a general equilibrium view of the problem), or to assume directly a stochastic process for C t and D t , leaving the process for un-modeled as done in the next section (and more in line with the …nance literature.) Thus, we can indi¤erently view a node s t in the tree describing the economy as a history of realizations given either by the list f(D ; )g
The representative agent has recursive smooth ambiguity preferences. At each 7 node, he has a set of priors (:; s t ) on the set of successor nodes, and a second order belief (: j s t ) on the parameter . For a given , (:; s t ) is one probability distribution on successors of node s t . The decision maker is uncertain about the data generating process and has thus a second order prior on it. This prior is updated as new information is accumulated.
Letting C t denote in…nite streams of consumption starting at node s t , the maximization problem of the representative agent is given by:
An equilibrium of this economy is given by price, consumption and asset holding processes (functions) such that given the price processes p f and p, the consumption and asset holding processes are a solution to the maximization program above and furthermore, e t = 1, b t = 0, C t = D t + t for any t.
Equilibrium analysis
In this section, we derive Euler equations that (implicitly) de…ne equilibrium prices. To do this, we rewrite the maximization program above in a recursive manner. At each point in time, denote t the second order beliefs and W t the wealth of the agent. Beliefs are updated as a function of the observed realization of the consumption and dividend signals according to Bayes law. Wealth follows the law of motion: W t+1 = (p t+1 + D t+1 )e t + b t + t+1 . As a result, the budget constraint in period t is given by C t = W t p t e t p f t b t . The recursive Bellman equation is thus given by:
subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion of the two state variables (wealth and beliefs). Denote J 1 the derivative of J w.r.t. its …rst argument. Then, the …rst order conditions to the problem with respect to b t and e t respectively are given by
By the familiar Benveniste-Scheinkman (envelope theorem) condition, we get that J 1 (W t ; t ) = u 0 (C t ). Replacing, we can rewrite the …rst order conditions as
where
) and where
The expressions are thus similar as the one in an economy with expected utility agent but for the terms Z t and t . As it turns out, with the speci…cation we will adopt in the rest of the paper (that is, (x) = exp( x)= ), we can simplify these expressions further since we now have Z t = 1. Thus, denoting R
, we have the following Euler equations
One has to solve these equations to obtain the conditional rates of return R f t and R t .
Remark 1 One of the computational issue will be to compute t . To that e¤ect, we need to compute J((W t+1 ; t+1 )) -the indirect value function. Note that this is nothing but the utility obtained by the representative agent along the equilibrium consumption path, which is simply de…ned by the stochastic process given the structure of the economy (representative agent model.) Therefore it coincides with V s t (C t ) -the direct value function, which is itself, as developed above in KMM 2008, a recursive formulation (see subsection 2.1.)
Remark 2 We can interpret t ( ; ) as e¤ecting a period-by-period distortion or change of measure on t , thereby putting more weight on those continuation paths which have lower valuation. The distortion t ( ) depends on the ambiguity attitude parameter, = 00 0 : This distortion, essentially encapsulates the e¤ect of ambiguity aversion; t is key to understanding why ambiguity aversion may a¤ect the predicted rates of return and hence, the equity premium. It is also signi…cant that the distortion t ( ; ) is potentially di¤erent in each period and at each node. So, it is not possible to ascribe an "as if", equivalent Bayesian prior for the entire event tree. Hence, it is not possible to interpret these Euler equations as arising from a fully Bayesian model.
Implications for the term structure of interest rates
We augment the setup of section 2.2 by adding bonds of di¤ering maturity. We explore the term structure of interest rates by pricing bonds of di¤erent maturities in equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume that there are n bonds. Bond indexed 1 has a payo¤ of one unit of consumption next period and zero afterward. The bond indexed i has zero payo¤ in period 1 to i 1 after its purchase, pays o¤ one unit of consumption at the i th period and 0 afterwards. Notation is as follows: b 1;t denotes holding at period t of the bond with a one period maturity. The associated price is denoted p f 1;t . This corresponds to what we previously denoted b t and p f t respectively. b i;t denotes holding at period t of the bond that pays o¤ in period t + i. The associated price is denoted p f i;t+1 . We adopt the convention that at each period, the agent sells o¤ all its bonds and buys back whatever he wants. By no arbitrage, it has to be the case that, at time t, the price of the bond b i;t has to be equal to the price of the bond b i 1;t+1 for all i. Thus, this convention is without loss of generality.
The rest of the setting is identical to that of section 2.2. Hence, the maximization problem of the representative agent is given by:
We now derive Euler equations that (implicitly) de…ne equilibrium prices. Wealth now follows the law of motion: W t+1 = (p t+1 +D t+1 )e t +b 1;t + P n i=2 p f i 1;t+1 b i;t + t + 1. As a result, the budget constraint in period t is given by C t = W t p t e t P n i=1 p f i;t b i;t . The recursive Bellman equation is thus given, as before, by:
Ct;b 1;t ;:::;bn;t;et
subject to the budget constraint and the law of motion of the two state variables (wealth and beliefs). The …rst order conditions to the problem with respect to b i;t and e t respectively are given by
By the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition, we get that J 1 (W t ; t ) = u 0 (C t ). Replacing and using the assumption that (x) = exp( x)= , we can rewrite the …rst order conditions as
where t ( ; ) is as given in equation (5). So that, denoting R
, we get the following Euler equations
. . .
Note, however, the law of iterated expectations does not hold, necessarily, in our set up. Hence, the recursive equations (12) through (15) may not be collapsed to obtain a "reduced form" version, as could be done in the case of expected utility preferences.
The term structure of interest rates is commonly de…ned as the collection of yields to maturity for bonds with di¤erent dates of maturity. In the case of zerocoupon bonds, the yield to maturity is simplỹ
3 The stochastic model of the economy
The basic speci…cation
In this section we spell out in detail representative agents belief about the stochastic evolution of the economy, assumed in the analysis. Speci…cally we assume, letting g t+1 ln
be the growth rate of consumption, the following model which incorporates an ever evolving hidden state, x t ; which determines the (aggregate) current economic health of the economy and two observable "signals"of the hidden state, the (log of) consumption growth and the (log of) dividend growth realized in period t, g
: (This is actually the CASE I model in Bansal and Yaron (2004) .)
(17) 
It is assumed that the values of parameters g; g ; ; x are known to the agent. The x 0 is unobserved but is assumed to have a Gaussian distribution with mean x 0 and variance 2 0 , …xing thereby the prior belief 0 . The agent observes the realizations of g t and g d t at each period (i.e. but does not observe the realization of x t and the epsilon's). This amounts to saying that at each date t, the agent knows the consumption growth rate g t+1 is distributed as a Normal with variance 2 g + 2 x but does not know its mean g + x t with probability 1 since he does not know, precisely, the realization of the current latent state variable(or, even its history for that matter). He has a belief t over the current x t , i.e., about the current realization of the hidden state and hence a belief about the mean of the probability distribution on the following period's consumption (and dividend) growth. Thus, the index of the distribution over the successor nodes in the event tree, the " " in KMM, corresponds in the context of this stochastic model to the variable x t . Given a current node f(C ; D )g t =0 , the immediate successor node is completely identi…ed by the pair of growth realizations g t ; g d t . In other words, the object (:; s t ) in the abstract KMM formulation, in this context corresponds to the product of two (conditionally independent, given x t ) Normal distributions
x ; acting together to give a probability distribution over the immediate successor nodes: The belief t ; the current "second order" belief over the possible probability distributions over the immediate successor nodes is just the period t belief over the hidden state x t . This belief is a Bayesian update (operationalized via a Kalman …lter), conditional on the entire history of realizations of g t and g d t . It turns out, the current belief about the hidden state is also Gaussian with meanx t and a (steady state) variancê P ;i.e., x t N (x t ;P ) whereP is de…ned in the sequel and may be completely characterized using the .Kalman …lter. Hence, t may be summarized by a single number, the meanx t . As mentioned,x t gets updated each period with the arrival of observations on of the aggregate dividend and consumption growth with the update tox t+1 given by (using the Kalman …lter theory):
where K is the crucial Kalman …lter variable de…ned as follows:
and the surprise or innovation to growth is given by
Finally,P is de…ned as the solution tô
Given this speci…cation, the continuation value (of holding a Lucas tree) at a node is completely identi…ed by the concurrent belief about the hidden state and the value of the current consumption, i.e., the pair (C t ; b x t ). Hence, our direct value function, adapted to the above speci…cation of beliefs and parametric formulations of risk and ambiguity attitude, may be written as:
where we "update"consumption as,
The density functions in the recursion equation are as follows:
) and dF ( x;t+1 ) are independent Normal N (0; 1) densities.
The probability density of the latent state, dF (x t ) is the Normal density N (x t ;P ).
Adding Uncertainty about persistence parameter
To be completed.
Calibrating ambiguity sensitive preferences
What is a plausible range for the ambiguity aversion parameter ? One way is to look at behavior corresponding to varying levels of that is easily interpretable and observable in simple settings. In this spirit, we may assess a plausible range for by, for instance, by looking at the experimental data on ambiguity premiums in Ellsberg 2-color-2-urn experiments. Camerer (1999) suggests an ambiguity premium around 10% of the expected value of a bet on the draw in the urn with the known proportion of balls. In order to calibrate the preferences of the ambiguity sensitive representative agent in the version of the Lucas-tree economy we consider in this paper, we work through the following thought exercise. Keeping matters simple, we assume an agent whose current (annual) consumption is W and who faces a prospect of either 2% or 0% in consumption growth in the following period. The growth occurs with a probability of , where takes a value in the interval [0; 1] with uniform probability. Suppose the agent has smooth ambiguity preferences of the exponential-power type: utility function is of the power type u(x) =
and the ambiguity attitude function is of the exponential type
. The "accepted" value of the parameter depends, to an extent, on the sub…eld of the profession. Recent microeconometric studies of risk aversion, in naturally occurring data sets and in the laboratory and …eld experiments, put estimates of to be around 0.7. (Chetty (2006) , Cicchetti and Dubin (1994) , Andersen, Harrison, Lau, and Rutstrom (2008)). However, macroeconomists, tend to think a value of around 2 is more plausible and consistent given their calibrated studies of business cycle dynamics. The …nance literature usually takes values of even larger, around 4 or more. Let us denote the certainty equivalent of a lottery with no ambiguity by CE 0 , and that under ambiguity aversion by CE( ).
Hence,
In the graphs in Figure 1 , we report the value of (as a function of ) required to achieve a value of ambiguity premium of about A% of the value of the bet, A is de…ned by the following equation:
Over the sample period 1977-2006, the normalized value of the per capita real consumption used in the value function computations ranges from 18 to 36; approximately. Graphs corresponding to W = 20 gives a fairly representative picture and that is what is depicted in Figure 1 .
Next we look at a calibration exercise that in spirit is the same as above but uses probability distributions that are much closer to the description of the uncertainty about the growth outcome (and, hence, the consumption) next period, as perceived by the representative agent in the Lucas tree model speci…ed in this paper. The stochastic environment given the known probability in urn I corresponds to the evaluation of the Lucas tree with respect to risk faced by an agent who holds rational expectations. Such an agent behaves as if he knew the true distribution governing g t+1 ; the growth in the next period. Put di¤erently, in this situation it is as if our representative agent is "told" that the true hidden state x t =x t and therefore faces no ambiguity, no uncertainty as to what the true distribution is: The certainty equivalent corresponding to rational expectations is given by:
where H (g; x) N x + g;
The urn II, where the decision maker is uncertain about the true probability distribution, now corresponds to the typical situation facing our ambiguity sensitive agent. He is uncertain what the true latent state is and therefore uncertain about the distribution governing the growth next period. Hence, in this case the certainty equivalent is:
and F (g; x) N x + g; . The new statistic is:
As before, we have u (x) = and (x) = exp(
In words, A ( ; ) is the premium (in percent terms) our representative agent will be willing to pay to be sure that the true distribution governing next period's growth is some given value ofx t rather than face the uncertainty described by the (steady state) belief N x; b P 1 2 : The Figure 4 graphs the function A ( ; ) corresponding to typical (average) value of (C t ;x t ) observed on the sample path covered in our computation of the rates of return. As will be seen, the ( ; ) pairs that seem to best …t the data on average rates of return corresponds to a very low value of A ( ; ), around 1%. There is a reason why it is reassuring that our key empirical results require the representative agent to have quite a low level of ambiguity aversion (i.e., lower than the average seen in experiments). The reason is the intuition that the representative agent will have a lower level of ambiguity aversion compared to the full population since its attitude corresponds more closely to those agents who bear most of the risk in general equilibrium. 5 Estimates of the e¤ect of ambiguity, as obtained on the sample path, on rates of return Using the stochastic speci…cation as presented in equations (17) through (25), we may rewrite the equations giving the equilibrium restrictions on rates of return (i.e., equations (34) through (36)) as follows:
and (x) = exp( x) , while V (C t+1 ; b x t+1 ) is the recursive direct value function as de…ned in (26). Note, the operator E xt takes expectations with respect to the measure N g + x t ; 2 g + 2 x , while E b xt takes expectations with respect to the measure N (x t ;P ):
The …rst step in computing the prediction on prices is the computation of the direct value function. This is accomplished as explained in Appendix 8.2. Then, given a sequence fC t ; b x t g t=t N t=t 1 of annual observations of aggregate per capita consumption in the time periods t = t 1 through t = t N we compute the associated time t probability distortion function sequence, f t (C t ; b x t )g t=t N t=t 1 using the formula given by equation (36). We use a Gaussian quadrature method to compute the integrals involved in expectations.
We calculate the moments of R t by the following steps: (1) solving equation (35) for the random variable R t as a function of C t+1 and b x t+1 using the Galerkin method; (2) Taking the expectation and standard deviation of R t ; noting R t is distributed as the random variable
Ct under the "reduced" belief, t xt : Thus the calculation of the conditional mean of the risky rate variable may be summarized by the following two steps. In the …rst step, we solve the following recursive equation for the variable C t+1 ; b x t+1 (which may be interpreted as the realization of the random variable R t if the node C t+1 ; b x t+1 were to be realized):
where,
and,
where C t+1 and b x t+1 are updated as detailed in equations (21) through (25). In the second step, the conditional mean (i.e., …rst moment) of the risky rate random variable, conditioned at (C t ; b x t ); is calculated as:
The risk free rate, which is not a random variable at time t; is calculated by solving the following equation:
The (conditional) equity premium at time t, is the random variable denoted R p t R t R f t . Therefore, the …rst moment of the (conditional) equity premium is given by
Analogously, the second moment of the equity premium, (R p t ), is computed as follows.
To obtain our estimates of rates of return corresponding to the ambiguity that actually obtained given the realized history, we plug the data of per capita (real) consumption C t and estimates of b x t at each period, corresponding to the …ltration imposed by the observed history of growth in real consumption and real dividend up until time period t per the formulae in equations (22) through (25), for the sample period under consideration, thereby generating a time series of moments. That is, a time series of R f t and a time series of …rst and second moments of the random variables R t and R p t ; predicted by the model along the sample path, given the publicly available statistical data on annual growth realizations. Tables 1 and  2 reports the average of these moments, averaged over the sample path 1977-2006, corresponding to the persistence parameter being set equal to 0.85 and 0.9, respectively. (Actually the tables report the moments of r f t R f t 1; r t R t 1 and r t r f t .) As noted in Appendix 8.1, the parameters of the model (except for the persistence parameter ) have been estimated (maximum likelihood) using data from . (The value of the persistence parameter was set to correspond closely to the estimate used in Bansal and Yaron (2004) and formally estimated in Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007) ; 0.85 is the exact annualized equivalent of the estimate in Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007) while 0.9 is pegged slightly higher, approximately equivalent to the estimate used by Hansen and Sargent (2007) .) By 1976, the parameter estimates had stabilized su¢ ciently. Hence, there is justi…cation in assuming that the representative agent behaves as if he knows the parameter values of the model from 1976 onwards. 6 Discussion of estimates obtained
We get a fairly complete picture of how ambiguity and ambiguity aversion a¤ects the rates of return, both in terms of the quantitative magnitude and the mechanism involved, by the comparative statics revealed by the numerical results reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. One may summarize the comparative statics as follows. As the aversion to ambiguity, i.e., increases, the average of the risk free rate, r f , decreases sharply. Further, this decrease is steeper, greater the risk aversion ( ). While the average of the risky rate, r, also decreases as increases, when compared to that for the risk free rate, the decrease is a lot milder compared to the decrease in the risk free rate. Hence, the equity premium, the average of r r f , increases with and this increment is greater, greater the : Finally, an increase in the value of the persistence parameter, ; decreases both the risk free and risky rates but the former more pronouncedly, hence the net e¤ect is that the average equity premium increases with : Turning to the second moments, the volatility of the risk free rate decreases quite insigni…cantly with an increase in , but increases, not insigni…cantly, with increase in : The volatility of the risky rate and the equity premium decreases very mildly with alpha but increases quite sharply with : Finally, the volatilities increase with : Table 3 , gives the moments of the rates for the Bayesian case, i.e., there is uncertainty about the "true" distribution on next period's growth rate (unlike in the usual, rational expectations case), and hence ambiguity is present but the agent is neutral to the ambiguity. The numbers in this table are instructive. It shows absolute levels of averages risk free and equity premium are very di¤erent compared to the case with aversion to ambiguity, but volatilities are quite similar.
The Table 4 gives a summary of the key results on conditional moments of the rates of return. This table shows the moments for di¤erent levels of the (relative) risk aversion coe¢ cient when the (absolute) ambiguity aversion coe¢ cient is calibrated to give a risk free rate close to 1%.
A key way to get at the intuition of the mechanism of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion driving the results is to understand the role of the "distortion function" t (x t j C t ; b x t ; ) in the equilibrium rates of return equations, (34) and (35). As mentioned earlier, t (x t j C t ; b x t ; ) is a Radon-Nikodym derivative that e¤ects a (node speci…c) change of measure on the Bayesian posterior t which, given our stochastic speci…cation, is in this case the measure x t N (x t ;P ): In the case of ambiguity aversion, i.e., concave, 0 is decreasing and hence one may see from equation (36) that the e¤ect of t is to create a new perceived, twisted posterior, t (x t ) N (x t ;P ), which puts relatively greater probability mass (compared to N (x t ;P )) on those xt 's (i.e., which in turn put more probability weight on successor nodes (s t ; g t+1 ) associated with lower continuation values,
The twisted posterior gives rise to a conditional one-step-ahead dis- Moments (1977 Moments ( -2007 N (x t ;P ) N x + g; 2 x + 2 g : Note, if at the time t the representative were to act like a rational expectations agent, he would put all posterior weight on x t ; i.e., Pr(x t =x t ) = 1, and evaluate t + 1 growth prospects using the distribution N x t + g; 2 x + 2 g : The Figure 4 shows the one-step-ahead distributions for the three cases corresponding to a typical (i.e., average value over the sample)x t for = 1:8 and = 2:5; Figure 6 shows the distributions for maximal and minimal (in sample) values ofx t : To get the key ideas about the mechanism of ambiguity aversion it is instructive to compare equilibrium restrictions on rates of return (analogous to equations (34) and (35)) in a simple Lucas tree model where the growth is i.i.d. and described, in turn, by the "rational expectations" distribution, the "Bayesian"distribution and the "twisted" distribution. Compared to the rational expectations distribution the twisted distribution, which corresponds to the case under ambiguity aversion, has a smaller mean and a larger spread. Abel (2002) argues that one can potentially account for the equity premium and the risk free rate when modeling pessimism and doubt in an otherwise standard asset pricing (Lucas tree) model. Pessimism is deemed as a leftward translation of the objective distribution in a way that the objective distribution …rst order stochastically dominates the subjective distribution while doubt is modeled in a way that the subjective distribution is a mean preserving spread of the objective distribution. Evidently, an ambiguity averse decision maker's beliefs, in e¤ect, incorporate endogenously both these elements, pessimism and doubt.
Conditional
The e¤ect of pessimism is that the demand for the risk less asset increases (agent desires a portfolio more robust to the uncertainty/ambiguity) driving its price up in equilibrium and thereby lowering the risk free rate. The pessimism has an e¤ect on risky rate too, and one can see that from the fact that the risky rates decline with increase in ambiguity aversion. This is so since the agent behaves as if he "expects" a lower dividend/consumption stream ... a fruit tree with a lower yield. But the e¤ect in the case of risky rate is milder since the risky asset is (in…nitely) long lived asset while the risky free rate re ‡ects the price of an one-period asset. The persistence e¤ect (from ) wears o¤ in the long run but a¤ects the price of the one period asset very robustly. The doubt factor, which essentially emerges from the Bayesian-mixing of the di¤erent "possible" …rst order distributions xt , increases the riskiness of the growth prospect. Since, the agent is risk averse, this doubt translates into an increase of the risky rate.
It is perhaps worth emphasizing, the volatilities (i.e., the second moments) go up compared to the Rational expectations case is also due to the doubt factor. Uncertainty/ambiguity about what the true distribution is leads to the mixture distribution which has a bigger variance. An ambiguity averse decision maker cares about the variance embedded in the mixture distribution (but so would a Bayesian agent as in Weitzman (2007)). Asset returns are computed using the CRSP value-weighted index. Dividend growth is imputed using the di¤erence in the returns on the value-weighed index with and without dividends multiplied by the market value. The risk-free rate was taken from Ken French's data library. Consumption is de…ned as the sum of services and non-durable consumption and was taken from BEA Table 1 .1. Population was taken from BEA Table 2 .2. Both per-capita consumption growth and dividend growth were converted to real terms using the average CPI for the year taken from the BLS. Annual data was available from 1930 until 2006, a total of 78 observations.
Concluding remarks

Parameter Estimates
The long-run risk model was …t to annual data using maximum likelihood.
(44)
Parameter estimates are contained in Table 5 . Figure 2 contains the …ltered x t along with 95% con…dence intervals using the parameters estimated using data until 1977. 
Computation of the recursive value function
Our …rst goal is to solve for the recursive equation (26) subject to (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), and (27).
Since this recursive equation does not admit a close form solution, we will rely on a numerical approximation method. We use an approach advocated by Judd (1998) , which amounts to use a polynomial approximation such that
where H ic ( ) and H ix ( ) are Hermite polynomials of order i c = 0; : : : ; n c and i x = 0; : : : ; n x respectively, with i c +i x < max(n c ; n x ). This therefore enables us to map the domain of evolution of C t , [0; 1), into that for Hermite polynomials, ( 1; 1). c is a positive number, whose determination will be discussed later. Similarly, ' x ( ) takes the form V (C exp (g + x + x " x + g " g ) ;
We rely on a Galerkin for each i c = 1; : : : ; n c , i x = 1; : : : ; n x , i c + i x 6 max(n c ; n x ).
7. if all projections are close enough to zero then stop, else update and go back to 3.
We use the same approach to compute the gross risky rate from the Euler equations, and assume that it can be approximated by R(C t ; b x t ) ' exp P ic;ix r ic;ix H ic (C t ))T ix ('(b x t )) 1 Likewise, we rely on the same method to compute the gross risk free rate, to get
exp P ic;ix r ic;ix H ic (C t ))T ix ('(b x t )) 1 From a practical point of view, we use Hermite polynomials up to the order 5 for b
x and Hermite polynomials up the order 3 for C, both for the value function and the risky rate. We use 20 nodes for b
x and C respectively. Integrals involved in the computation of expectations are evaluated using a 12 nodes quadrature method. c and x are respectively set to 2 and 40.
In order to assess the accuracy of the solution, we compute the relative residuals R(C t ; b x t ; ) = E(C t ; b x t ; ) V (C t ; b x t )
where C t and b x t are evaluated outside of the values used to compute decision rules. Since we are interested in plugging data in the decision rules, we evaluate the relative residuals using those data. We then compute the following quantities E 1 = log 10 (EjR(C t ; b x t ; )j) E 2 = log 10 (R(C t ; b x t ; ) 2 ) E 1 = log 10 (max(jR(C t ; b x t ; )j))
The …rst criterion provides with a scale free measure of the average intertemporal error an agent would make using the approximate solution, the second criterion furnishes a similar information, although slightly di¤erent as it can be interpreted in terms of volatility, and the last criterion gives the maximal error the agent would make. In order to understand the criterion let's assume that E1=-6. This tells us that using the approximate rule, the agent would make a relative error of 0.0001% which could be taken to be small enough -from an economic point of view -to consider the approximation as accurate.
Conditional Moments 
